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Perfect Symmetries 
Abstract 
While empirical symmetries relate situations, theoretical symmetries relate models of a theory we 
use to represent them. An empirical symmetry is perfect if and only if any two situations it relates 
share all intrinsic properties. Sometimes one can use a theory to explain an empirical symmetry 
by showing how it follows from a corresponding theoretical symmetry. The theory then reveals a 
perfect symmetry. I say what this involves and why it matters, beginning with a puzzle which is 
resolved by the subsequent analysis. I conclude by pointing to applications and implications of 
the ideas developed earlier in the paper. 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of symmetry principles in physical theory is now widely acknowledged among 
both physicists and philosophers. Reflection on increasingly abstract symmetries has become an 
important heuristic in theory construction.1 Philosophers have offered analyses of various kinds of 
symmetry that a theory may display, and of the relations between these.2 Not all symmetries of a 
theory correspond to symmetries in nature, even when that theory succeeds in representing 
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significant features of our world. Sometimes a theoretical symmetry is broken, as when a theory’s 
equations have a solution that lacks their symmetry. Sometimes a theoretical symmetry associated 
with alternative representational devices may have no empirical consequences. But in an 
important class of cases one can use a theory to account for an empirical symmetry by exhibiting 
that symmetry as a consequence of a symmetry of the theory. Such explanations are especially 
satisfying and may provide convincing reasons to believe the theory that makes them possible. In 
such a case I shall say that the theory reveals a perfect symmetry. 
 A theory reveals a perfect symmetry when a theoretical symmetry implies a corresponding 
empirical symmetry. In what follows I say what this involves and why it matters. Section 2 
presents a puzzle to motivate the analysis to come. Section 3 distinguishes various kinds of 
empirical symmetry and illustrates them with examples. Section 4 presents an analysis of one 
kind of theoretical symmetry and contrasts this with theoretical symmetries of other kinds. 
Section 5 explores different ways in which a theory can explain an empirical symmetry, focusing 
on the exhibition of a perfect symmetry: this section resolves section 2's puzzle.  I conclude by 
pointing to applications and implications of the ideas developed earlier in the paper. One 
Appendix exhibits an important joint model, and another presents details of an argument from 
section 5.  
  
2. Is Faraday in the Same Boat as Galileo? 
Here are two examples of observations of a symmetry in nature. 
 Galileo described the first example in his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World 
Systems, which contains the following famous passage. 
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Shut yourself up with some friend in the main cabin below decks on some large ship, and 
have with you there some flies, butterflies, and other small flying animals. Have a large 
bowl of water with some fish in it; hang up a bottle that empties drop by drop into a wide 
vessel beneath it. With the ship standing still, observe carefully how the little animals fly 
with equal speed to all sides of the cabin. The fish swim indifferently in all directions; the 
drops fall into the vessel beneath; and, in throwing something to your friend, you need 
throw it no more strongly in one direction than another, the distances being equal; 
jumping with your feet together, you pass equal spaces in every direction. When you have 
observed all these things carefully (though there is no doubt that when the ship is standing 
still everything must happen in this way), have the ship proceed with any speed you like, 
so long as the motion is uniform and not fluctuating this way and that. You will discover 
not the least change in all the effects named, nor could you tell from any of them whether 
the ship was moving or standing still. (Galileo [1632/1967], pp. 186-7) 
The observations Galileo describes provide evidence that setting a confined system in uniform 
rectilinear motion has no noticeable effect on mechanical processes taking place within the 
system, and is in that sense a symmetry of those situations. This symmetry is closely related to the 
following relativity principle, often called the principle of Galilean relativity3: 
Situations related by a transformation from one state of uniform rectilinear motion to 
another are internally indistinguishable. 
A uniform relative velocity transformation is a symmetry of such situations. 
 Galileo’s ship provides a classic illustration of an empirical symmetry. His description of 
phenomena in its cabin in different states of motion supplies rich instances of that symmetry that 
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are apparent even in the absence of a theory capable of accounting for them. Stimulated by these 
and other phenomena, Newton later found a dynamical theory of which Galilean relativity is a 
consequence, provided that the situations involve only mechanical processes conforming to his 
laws of motion, and that all masses and forces involved are independent of absolute velocity. Still 
later Einstein formulated a different theory (special relativity) that implies a reinterpreted 
extension of Galileo’s relativity principle to all (non-gravitational) processes. I shall examine this 
implication in more detail in section 5. For now, only two things matter. First, observations like 
those Galileo describes in this passage provide evidence that uniform velocity boosts are 
empirical symmetries of such situations.  Second, these observations could be, and indeed were, 
made prior to and independent of any theory capable of accounting for them. 
 Michael Faraday’s description of his own observations provides the second example. In 
1836, Faraday constructed a hollow cube with sides 12 feet long, covered it with good conducting 
materials but insulated it carefully from the ground, and electrified it to such an extent that sparks 
flew from its surface. An entry in his diary entry during May 1836 reads in part 
I went into this cube and lived in it, but though I used lighted candles, electrometers, and 
all other tests of electrical states, I could not find the least influence upon them. 
(Maxwell [1881], p. 53) 
Here Faraday’s observations bear on another symmetry in nature: charging the conducting 
exterior of a confined region of space has no effect on electrical phenomena in the interior of that 
region. These observations are often glossed by saying that by electrifying his cube Faraday had 
succeeded in raising it to a higher electric potential than the rest of his laboratory. That suggests 
the following relativity principle 
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Situations related by a transformation from one state of uniform electric potential to 
another are internally indistinguishable. 
A uniform electric potential transformation is a symmetry of such situations. Taking this 
symmetry to heart, Maxwell developed the theory of electromagnetism that bears his name. 
Indeed, Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory accounts for the empirical symmetry observed by 
Faraday in his cube. But Faraday needed no such theory to make his observations or to appreciate 
the importance of the empirical symmetry that grounded them. 
 In these passages, Faraday and Galileo describe observations of symmetries in nature. In 
each case, different situations are compared, and it is noted that these are indistinguishable with 
respect to a whole class of phenomena. The parallels are striking. In each case, the relevant 
symmetry was observed before the development of any theory capable of accounting for it. In 
each case, observation of an empirical symmetry stimulated the successful construction of a 
theory capable of explaining why it obtains. 
 The parallels appear to extend to internal features of the explanatory theories themselves. 
Uniform velocity boosts are among the Galilean transformations that constitute symmetries of the 
dynamics of Newton’s theory, and also among the Lorentz transformations that constitute 
symmetries of the dynamics of special relativity. The addition of a constant to all electric 
potentials is among the local gauge transformations that constitute symmetries of Maxwell’s 
electromagnetic theory. By a local gauge transformation in this context I mean a transformation 
in the electromagnetic 4-vector potential A: which takes the form A:→A:+M:7 for some suitably 
smooth function 7(x,t) of the space-time coordinates (x,t).4 The electric potential N is the time-
component of the 4-vector potential A:= (N, −A), where A is the magnetic vector potential. 
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Setting 7=kt induces the local gauge transformation (N, −A) → (N +k, −A): so this class of local 
gauge transformations simply adds a constant k to the value of the electric potential everywhere.  
 But now a puzzle emerges. For while the Galilean and Lorentz boost symmetry of 
Newton’s and Einstein’s theories each in its own way reflects the empirical relativity of motion, 
local gauge symmetry is usually thought of as a purely formal feature of classical electromagnetic 
theory, with no empirical correlate, and indeed no empirical content. If this is correct then, as 
Brown and Brading ([2004], p. 657) say ‘there can be no analogue of the Galileo ship experiment 
for local gauge transformations.’ But then why doesn’t Faraday’s cube provide a perfect analogue 
of Galileo’s ship for a class of local gauge transformations of classical electromagnetism? To 
solve this puzzle it will be necessary to achieve a better understanding of different ways in which 
the symmetries of a theory may be related to the empirical symmetries it explains. The first step is 
to get clearer on the nature of empirical and theoretical symmetries themselves. 
 
3. Empirical Symmetries 
Abstractly, a symmetry of a structure is an automorphism–a mapping of the elements of the 
structure back onto themselves so as to preserve the structure. Formally, a structure 
S = <D,R1 ,R2 ,…,Rn > consists of a domain D of elements and a sequence of relations Ri (i=1,...,n) 
defined on D. Let f : D ÷ D be a 1-1 mapping of the domain of S onto itself. Define the 
transformed structure Sf by Sf / <D, f*R1 , f*R2  ,…, f*Rn >, where, for each m-place relation Ri,  
f*Ri [f(d1) ,…, f(dm)] if and only if Ri [d1  ,…, dm]. Then f is a symmetry of S just in case Sf = S.5 
  Many different structures may be distinguished in a given object. If the structure is that of 
a physical object, the elements of D will generally be parts of that object, while the Ri specify 
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properties of and relations among these parts. A physical object may have a certain size, shape, 
composition and pattern of colors. But abstract objects also exhibit a variety of structures. SU(2) 
is a group, it is non-Abelian, it is a Lie group (and so also a differentiable manifold), it is 
compact, it is simple, etc. We are concerned here with physical theories and the situations to 
which they may be applied, so we need to say what kinds of object these involve. 
 A physical theory specifies a set of models—mathematical structures—that may be used 
to represent various different situations, actual as well as merely possible, and to make claims 
about them. Any application of a physical theory is to a situation involving some system, actual or 
merely possible. Only rarely is that system the entire universe: typically, one applies a theory to 
some subsystem, regarded as a relatively isolated part of its world. The application proceeds by 
using the theory to model the situation of that subsystem in a way that abstracts from and 
idealizes the subsystem's own features, and also neglects or idealizes its interactions with the rest 
of the world. 
 A system may itself display a symmetric structure at a certain level of idealization. A 
human body has a rough bilateral symmetry, while a carefully prepared crystal more precisely 
displays a variety of symmetries. A single system may also display symmetric behavior: consider 
the motion of a pendulum, or the performance of a mirror fugue. The symmetric structure in this 
case is that of the situation in which the system figures rather than that of the system itself. There 
are even cases in which it is hard to draw a distinction between system and situation. Think of a 
possible world set in Newtonian space-time. A temporal inversion about an arbitrary temporal 
instant is a symmetry of the space-time of this world. 
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 A symmetry involving an actual physical system and its situation is empirical. One can 
observe and measure the situation of the system to collect evidence that relations among its 
spatiotemporal parts are or would be indifferent to the action of a symmetry transformation of 
those parts. Such evidence may be direct (the crystal) or indirect (Newtonian space-time). 
 But Galileo’s ship illustrates the fact that not all empirical symmetries pertain to a single 
situation. In that case velocity boosts are observed to be a symmetry of a class of similar but 
distinct situations, in each of which the ship is moving with a different velocity. Renderings of a 
particular tune provide another example of a symmetry of a class of situations. Renderings of the 
same tune all have a similar structure, even if they are in different keys and some include errors. 
Flawless renderings of the same tune are related by a symmetry transformation that transposes 
one key into another. 
 In such cases, a class of different situations constitutes the domain of a structure, and a 
symmetry of that structure maps one situation onto another. Formally, suppose that situations of a 
certain kind K all have a somewhat similar structure. Any situation with that structure may be 
transformed into another by a transformation f. If a subset D of K is closed under f, then f is a 
symmetry of the “larger” structure E = < D, Pj >, where the properties Pj define the kind K. 
 Galileo describes processes occurring in the cabin of a ship as having just the same 
dynamic structure, independent of how fast the ship moves over the sea. Different instances of 
each process are related by the same symmetry transformation—corresponding to a change in the 
uniform horizontal velocity of the ship. Here one can think of K as a class of kinematically 
possible motions of the objects in the cabin (i.e. those motions relative to the cabin in which every 
object has some continuous trajectory or other), while D contains only dynamically possible 
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motions (i.e. just those kinematically possible motions of objects that are compatible with the 
forces acting on them). Renderings of the same tune (K) all have a somewhat similar structure, 
even if they are in different keys and some include errors. Flawless renderings of the same tune 
(D) are related by a symmetry transformation that transposes one key into another. 
 One can observe and measure situations to collect evidence that situations related by a 
symmetry transformation cannot be distinguished by specific procedures. Flawless renderings of a 
tune in different keys can be directly distinguished by someone with perfect pitch: the rest of us 
may need instruments. According to Galileo, measurements of purely mechanical magnitudes 
inside the cabin cannot distinguish between different states of uniform horizontal motion of a 
ship. These are two examples of the kind of empirical symmetry among situations which will be 
at the focus of interest here. They prompt the following abstract formulations. 
 As I will understand it, an empirical symmetry is a feature of a class of situations—actual 
as well as possible. A 1-1 mapping n : S ÷ S of a set of situations onto itself is an empirical 
symmetry with respect to C-type measurements if and only if no two situations related by n can be 
distinguished by measurements of type C. 
 This is a contextual definition, since what it counts as an empirical symmetry depends on 
what measurement procedures are considered. In the case of Galileo’s ship and Faraday’s cube 
one context is particularly salient. It would be easy to observe the ship’s motion over the ocean by 
hearing the ship’s wake or viewing it through a porthole, or by consulting a GPS device in the 
cabin. It would have been only too easy for Faraday to observe the charge state of his cube by 
carelessly stepping out into his laboratory, or more safely by looking for the sparks emitted by the 
cube when charged. Such observations involve measurement procedures that provide (more or 
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less) reliable information about the relation between the situation inside the cabin/cube and its 
external environment. In an idealization of the situation in which the interior is regarded as 
confined in such a way as to exclude any transmissions from outside, no such information is 
available within. Observations and measurements inside can then only provide information about 
the intrinsic properties of the internal situation. 
 I shall say that a measurement is confined to a situation if and only if it is a measurement 
of intrinsic properties of (one or more objects in) that situation.6 Then a 1-1 mapping n : S ÷ S of 
a set of situations onto itself is a strong empirical symmetry if and only if no two situations 
related by n can be distinguished by measurements confined to each situation. Note that the 
reference to measurement is not superfluous here, in so far as a situation may feature 
unmeasurable intrinsic properties. We shall see an example of this soon. 
 Spatial translations and rotations provide familiar examples of strong empirical 
symmetries of situations involving geometrical figures in Euclidean space. If S is any figure in 
Euclidean space, then a translation and/or rotation n yields a congruent figure n(S). Note that 
situations in S related by a transformation n may be in the same or different possible worlds: if n 
is a strong empirical symmetry, then n(S) may be in the same world w as S, but only if w is itself 
sufficiently symmetric. 
 Uniform velocity boosts are strong empirical symmetries of a set of situations involving 
purely mechanical phenomena in a Newtonian world, since a Galilean boost by velocity v applied 
to the situation S of a mechanical system in such a world yields a situation nv(S) that is 
indistinguishable from S with respect to all measurable intrinsic properties. The special principle 
of relativity guarantees that uniform velocity (Lorentz) boosts are also strong empirical 
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symmetries of electromagnetic and all other phenomena in a special relativistic world. Even when 
a situation S actually obtains, nv(S) will rarely do so. In some cases, careful laboratory 
manipulations may actually bring it about, but the situation nv(S) will more typically obtain only 
in some "merely" (i.e. non-actual) possible world. Galileo’s ship provides at best a rough and 
approximate realization of the relativity principle it is used to dramatize. A turbulence-free 
aircraft in level flight, and a spaceship whose rockets are not firing, supply observable situations 
that more closely realize strong empirical symmetries associated with uniform velocity boosts. 
 This is typical of the observational status of empirical symmetries. Kosso ([2000]) stated 
two necessary conditions for the observation of a symmetry of interest to physics. One must 
observe that the specified invariant property is in fact the same, before and after, and one must 
observe that the specified transformation has taken place. It follows that an empirical symmetry 
may or may not be observable. It may be too hard to create the necessary situations, or to find 
them realized in nature: and one may not be able to certify that one has indeed encountered the 
right situations. What makes a symmetry empirical is just that the necessary measurements would 
reveal it if they could be performed in actual situations. But as the examples of Galileo and 
Faraday show, one may be able to observe an empirical symmetry whether or not one has a theory 
that accounts for it. 
 Even though uniform velocity boosts are strong empirical symmetries of mechanical 
processes in a Newtonian world, they do effect a significant change in a mechanical system. 
According to Newton, a uniform velocity boost changes the absolute velocity of a system to 
which it is applied.  But since Newton’s theory itself implies that this change is not measurable 
(assuming that all masses and forces are independent of absolute velocity), no measurements on 
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mechanical systems confined to situations related by a uniform velocity boost can distinguish 
between those situations. 
 While uniform velocity boosts are strong empirical symmetries of mechanical processes in 
a Newtonian world, in a special relativistic world they are not merely strong but perfect 
symmetries of all processes. An empirical symmetry n is perfect if and only if any two situations 
related by n are duplicates, where a duplicate of a situation is a situation that shares all its 
intrinsic properties. Every perfect symmetry is strong, but the converse does not hold, as is 
apparent from the example of uniform velocity boosts in the Newtonian world of mechanical 
systems: In such a world, subjecting a mechanical process to a uniform velocity boost does not 
produce a duplicate process since the absolute velocity of every object is now different.  
 
4. Theoretical Symmetries 
One should distinguish symmetries of a set of situations to which a theory may be applied from 
symmetries internal to that theory.  One place to look for theoretical symmetries in a dynamical 
theory of physics is in its equations of motion. Since these equations pick out a class of 
dynamically possible models, one can alternatively focus on symmetries of this class of models. It 
is not necessary to endorse any version of the so-called semantic conception of scientific theories 
to acknowledge that many physical theories, as well as theories in other sciences, are often 
conveniently characterized by specifying the class of models associated with the theory. Here 
models are structures (typically mathematical) that may be used to represent situations. So an 
analysis of a theoretical symmetry as a transformation that maps models of a theory onto other 
models may be expected to be widely applicable. But what kind of transformation? 
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 On the broadest conception, a theoretical symmetry would be any 1-1 function from the 
set of a theory’s models onto itself. But while this is a symmetry of the theory in the sense that it 
leaves its model class invariant, it is too broad to be of much interest. As Ismael and van Fraassen 
([2003]) noted, there are theoretical symmetries in this sense that transform a model of Newton’s 
theory with one free particle into models with millions of particles interacting in complex ways. 
As an automorphism of the model class of a theory, an interesting theoretical symmetry should 
preserve more of the internal structure of the models it relates: cardinality of that structure’s 
domain is only one very weak requirement. 
 Ismael and van Fraassen ([2003]) entertain another condition: that a theoretical symmetry 
preserve qualitative features of every model. They take such features to be ‘quantities that can 
characterize a situation, distinguishable by even a gross discrimination of colour, texture, smell 
and so on.’ (p. 376), where (as they have explained) a quality can be regarded as a quantity with 
range of values 1 (possessed) and 0 (not possessed). To maintain the present clear distinction 
between models and situations, one should rather characterize qualitative features of a model as 
those elements of the model that may serve to represent qualitative features (in their sense) of 
situations.7 They distinguish this condition from a stronger condition—that a theoretical 
symmetry preserve measurable features of a model, where these generally extend beyond 
qualitative features in a theory-guided way. Newtonian theory, for example, connects the masses 
and forces its models are intended to represent to qualitative features such as positions and times 
in such a way as to permit the measurement of the former by observation of the latter. 
 In the case of space-time theories, a theoretical symmetry might be required to preserve 
those features of its models that serve to represent space-time structure, which gives rise to the 
 14
notion of a space-time symmetry of a theory. So, for example, space-time translations and 
rotations are space-time symmetries of a Newtonian theory, while Galilean boosts are space-time 
symmetries only if that theory’s models do not permit the representation of a privileged state of 
absolute rest. 
 The interesting relations among these and related conceptions of theoretical symmetry 
have been explored elsewhere.8 But there is one conception of theoretical symmetry that is 
narrower than any of them and may at first sight seem to be of little interest. Perhaps surprisingly, 
this is the conception that will shed the most light on perfect symmetries. Accordingly, I will say 
that 
A mapping f : M 6M  of the set of models of a theory 1 onto itself is a theoretical 
symmetry of 1 if and only if the following condition obtains: 
For every model m of 1 that may be used to represent (a situation S in) a possible world 
w, f(m) may also be used to represent (S in) w. 
Two models related by a theoretical symmetry of 1 are theoretically equivalent in 1.  
 Thus defined, the theoretical symmetries of a theory would include only the identity 
mapping if no two of its models could be used to represent the same situation. But we know of 
many a theory with a redundant set of models. Among gauge theories, such redundancy is the 
norm. In analytic Euclidean geometry, a spatial configuration has many algebraic models, 
corresponding to a choice of spatial origin, type of coordinates (rectangular Cartesian, cylindrical 
polar, spherical polar, etc.) and choice of coordinate axes and their orientation. Even in a 
coordinate-free formulation, general relativity permits the representation of a possible world by 
any model from within an equivalence class of diffeomorphically related models.  
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 The redundancy of representational devices is both a resource and a danger for the 
theorist. It permits one to choose whichever of a set of theoretically equivalent models offers the 
most convenient representation of a given situation, and so simplifies its treatment within the 
theory. But it may also mislead one into believing that a mere choice of representational device 
has empirical significance. Einstein himself was so misled while struggling to formulate his 
general theory of relativity.9 For a while he was convinced by the so-called “hole” argument that 
the theory could not be generally covariant, precisely because he had not yet come to appreciate 
that diffeomorphically related models may be taken to represent the same physical situation. 
 This conviction was not the result of a simple mistake. The case of analytic geometry is 
atypical. It is often hard to say when distinct models of a theory simply represent the same 
situation, and when they may represent distinct situations. It is especially hard when it is the 
theory itself that provides our only initial access to those features of situations it represents by 
newly introduced structures—hard, but not impossible. As the next section will show, there are 
cases when a theoretical symmetry of a theory itself implies an empirical symmetry of situations 
it models. In such cases the empirical symmetry is perfect. While models related by a theoretical 
symmetry may always be used to represent the very same situation, here they may be used 
alternatively to represent distinct but intrinsically indistinguishable situations.   
 
5. Explaining Empirical Symmetries 
Even when a theory explains an empirical symmetry, the explanation need not appeal to a 
theoretical symmetry of that theory. Newton’s explanation of the principle of Galilean relativity 
provides an example. 
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 Assuming that no masses or forces depend on absolute velocities, Newton’s laws of 
motion entail that uniform velocity boosts are strong empirical symmetries of a set of situations 
involving purely mechanical phenomena in a Newtonian world. One can use Newton’s theory to 
explain the principle of Galilean relativity by noting that we live in an approximately Newtonian 
world in which Galilean relativity (restricted to mechanical phenomena) is a consequence of this 
strong empirical symmetry of uniform velocity boosts. But a non-zero uniform velocity boost is 
not a theoretical symmetry of Newton’s theory. Two models related by such a transformation 
cannot be used to represent the same situation, since each would represent the absolute velocity 
of every object in that situation differently. 
 Uniform velocity boosts are dynamical but not theoretical symmetries of Newton’s theory. 
Nor are they space-time symmetries of the Newtonian space-time structure on which Newton 
based his theory. Earman ([1989]) argued that any theory whose dynamical symmetries exceeded 
its space-time symmetries was not well-formulated, and that it posited excess spatiotemporal 
structure. In this case, the excess structure is provided by Newton’s enduring absolute space, the 
trajectories of whose points define a privileged but unobservable state of absolute rest. By 
eliminating from the models of Newton’s theory anything capable of representing this superfluous 
theoretical structure, one arrives at an empirically equivalent theory, set in what Geroch ([1978]) 
calls Galilean space-time, of which uniform velocity boosts are theoretical symmetries. In this 
revised version, Newtonian theory explains the symmetries associated with Galilean relativity by 
appeal to these theoretical symmetries. It thereby exhibits uniform velocity boosts as not merely 
strong but perfect symmetries of mechanical systems in a Newtonian world. 
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 Einstein ([1905]) extended the set of situations among which uniform velocity boosts are 
empirical symmetries to situations involving non-mechanical phenomena, and specifically 
electromagnetic phenomena. His reasoning in that paper is interesting. It begins as follows ‘It is 
known that Maxwell's electrodynamics—as usually understood at the present time—when applied 
to moving bodies, leads to asymmetries which do not appear to be inherent in the phenomena.’ 
The paper goes on to defend a new understanding of Maxwell’s theory whose application to 
moving bodies leads to no such asymmetries. Of course, this new understanding involves the 
radical changes in how we conceive of space and time for which Einstein is famous. But from the 
present perspective what is striking is the way in which Einstein was able successfully to fulfill 
his desire to provide an alternative theoretical explanation of the empirical symmetries of 
electrodynamic phenomena which eliminated the theoretical asymmetries in the existing account. 
Within the new space-time structure, Maxwell’s theory explained the strong empirical symmetries 
of electrodynamic phenomena by deriving them from a theoretical symmetry of the theory. It 
thereby exhibited these as perfect symmetries. 
 These two cases exhibit a very similar structure. We begin with an empirical symmetry. 
This is then explained as a consequence of a theory. The explanation entails that the empirical 
symmetry is strong, but not perfect. It does not appeal to a theoretical symmetry of the theory 
itself. But the theory is perceived as in some measure defective, since its models mark a 
distinction between situations—a distinction which that theory itself implies is neither observable 
nor measurable by us. Indeed, it is the same distinction in each case—the distinction between one 
uniform absolute velocity and another. After the theory has been reformulated, the defect is 
remedied. A structure is removed from the models that had been intended to represent the 
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problematic, unobservable feature of these situations. This introduces a new theoretical symmetry 
into the theory, which serves as the basis for a new kind of explanation of the empirical symmetry 
that reveals this to be not merely strong but perfect.10 
 In both these cases, a theory comes to reveal a perfect symmetry by implying that distinct 
but symmetrically related situations are in fact duplicates of one another—they share all the same 
intrinsic properties. This may seem surprising. As analyzed in section 3, a theoretical symmetry 
concerns only a single situation. How can it imply that two distinct situations are duplicates? 
Moreover, the puzzle presented in section 2 suggests that there may be theories whose theoretical 
symmetries carry no such implication. To remove the surprise and solve the puzzle we need to 
exhibit the mechanism by which a theoretical symmetry of a theory may be transferred to an 
empirical symmetry of situations its models represent. It turns out that this mechanism will work 
only if the theory has certain special features. 
  How exactly does the theory of special relativity imply that Lorentz boosts are perfect 
symmetries of situations represented by its models? Here is a sketch of the argument: further 
details are spelled out in Appendix A. Consider a localized situation S represented by model m of 
the special theory of relativity. S is localized because it occupies a compact region of space-time. 
Because Lorentz boosts are theoretical symmetries of the theory, S is equally represented by a 
Lorentz-boosted model mN=7!v(m): one can think of mN as representing S from the perspective of 
a frame FN moving at velocity v with respect to a frame F from whose perspective S is represented 
by m. Now special relativity itself implies that m also represents a distinct situation SN=7v(S) in 
exactly the same way that mN represents S. Since m and mN represent S as having exactly the same 
intrinsic properties, it follows that m represents S and SN as having exactly the same intrinsic 
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properties. Hence special relativity implies that Lorentz boosts are perfect empirical symmetries 
of all localized situations to which the theory applies. 
 But doesn’t an exactly parallel argument show that a theoretical gauge symmetry of 
classical electromagnetic theory (addition of a constant to the value of the electric potential at 
each point inside the cube) implies a corresponding perfect empirical gauge symmetry of the 
situation inside Faraday’s cube? It does not, since there is a crucial disanalogy between this case 
and the case of Lorentz boosts in special relativity. Special relativity itself implies that situation 
SN differs from situation S precisely by application of a Lorentz boost, thereby justifying the 
equation SN=7v(S). It implies that these situations differ in just this way, because every joint 
model in the theory of the combined situation SrSN represents S, SN as related by a Lorentz boost. 
But classical electromagnetic theory has no corresponding implication. 
 Classical electromagnetic theory does have joint models of a combined situation C0rC+  
involving the interiors C0, C+ of uncharged and charged Faraday’s cubes (respectively) that 
represent the electric potentials inside the cubes by functions differing by a constant k. But it also 
has joint models of that same situation C0rC+  that represent the electric potentials inside the 
cubes by identical functions.11 So while an argument parallel to that in the case of Lorentz boosts 
in special relativity does establish the existence of a situation C+ distinct from C0, it does not 
prove that C+ is related to C0 by an empirical gauge symmetry. Local gauge symmetry is merely a 
theoretical symmetry of classical electromagnetism; and local symmetries of the form 
(N, −A) → (N +k, −A) imply no corresponding empirical gauge symmetry, perfect or not.  
 The relation between C+ and C0 is worth considering further, because these situations are 
related by an empirical symmetry that does not correspond to any empirical gauge symmetry of 
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classical electromagnetism. Note first that C+ is related to C0 by a space-time translation—
certainly a perfect symmetry of classical electromagnetism, but by no means an empirical gauge 
symmetry. But the empirical symmetry relating C+ and C0 may appear richer and more interesting 
than a mere space-time translation. 
 The charge accumulated on the surface of the charged cube will give rise to an electric 
field outside the cube(s). Every joint model in classical electromagnetic theory of a situation 
C0rC+  incorporating C+ and C0 must represent this electric field. The line integral L of this 
electric field along a curve joining any two points, one in the interior of the charged cube, the 
other in the interior of the uncharged cube, is an invariant of all situations C0rC+  incorporating 
both C+ and C0.12 So classical electromagnetic theory implies that the transformation C0 → C+ is 
an empirical symmetry that seems to be more than just a space-time translation, and indeed this is 
a perfect empirical symmetry. 
 But while the value of L represents a relation between C0 and C+, this relation obtains only 
by virtue of their relations to the electromagnetic situation outside the cube(s). In David Lewis’s 
([1986, p. 62]) terminology, it is neither an internal nor an external relation between C0 and C+. I 
follow custom in calling a relation (e.g. having the same owner) whose obtaining depends on 
relations between its relata and some distinct object (e.g. the owner) an extrinsic relation. The line 
integral of the electric field joining points in the interior of the cube(s) represents an extrinsic 
relation between C0 and C+. To suppose one can change the electromagnetic condition inside 
Faraday’s cube by charging its exterior is just as mistaken as to think one can move a car from 
New York to Los Angeles merely by selling it. 
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 Despite appearances, according to classical electromagnetism the only empirical 
symmetry relating C+ and C0 is a space-time translation. This is not an empirical correlate of the 
theoretical local gauge transformation of adding a constant (L) to the value of the electric 
potential at each point inside the cube. Moreover, a constant difference in electrostatic potential is 
not an invariant of the models of C0rC+ within classical electromagnetism. Contrast this with the 
case of Lorentz boosts in special relativity, where every model agrees on the size of the velocity 
difference between boosted and un-boosted situations.13 In classical electromagnetic theory, the 
perfect empirical symmetry between C+ and C0 does not reflect a theoretical gauge symmetry. 
 Another way to see this is to note that this empirical symmetry is also a consequence of a 
formulation of classical electromagnetism whose models include no gauge potentials, but only 
electric and magnetic fields. While these suffice to exhibit the extrinsic difference between C+ 
and C0 represented by the line integral of the electric field between them, the models of this 
formulation admit no gauge transformations of which this is an invariant magnitude. 
 It is natural to describe the state of Faraday’s cube when charged by saying that it has 
been raised to an electric potential with respect to the ground. But this is not something that we 
observe—all we observe are differences in electric field outside the cube when charged and 
uncharged. And it is not entailed by classical electromagnetic theory, since that theory has models 
that represent this electric field as arising not from a difference in electric potential, but from 
variations in magnetic vector potential (see Appendix B). 
 It is interesting to note that the empirical symmetry between C+ and C0 does reflect a 
theoretical symmetry of a different theory. Classical electrostatics with potentials can model C0, 
C+ and C0rC+ . But in classical electrostatics the only models of C0rC+  are those that represent 
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two distinct cubes at rest with respect to one another. Moreover, every such model represents C0, 
C+ as at different electrostatic potentials N0, N+ respectively. In this way, classical electrostatics 
represents a relation between C+ and C0 that is external rather than extrinsic. This theory not only 
implies a perfect electrostatic empirical symmetry between C+ and C0: it also implies that this 
uniquely corresponds to the theoretical symmetry of adding a constant to the value of the electric 
potential at each point in a model of a localized situation. In classical electrostatics, but not the 
full theory of classical electromagnetism, this empirical symmetry follows from a corresponding 
theoretical symmetry that might well be regarded as a gauge symmetry. 
 In a world with static electricity but no magnetism, the empirical success of electrostatics 
might have justified belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory in which the only joint models of 
the combined situation C0rC+ represented an electric potential difference between the cubes of 
the same constant value )N. In such a world, the limited theoretical “gauge” symmetry N0 →N+ 
=N0+)N would have implied a corresponding empirical gauge symmetry. We would have had 
indirect empirical evidence that differences in electric potential are real, as are transformations 
from one state of electric potential to a state of lower or higher potential—just as, in our world, 
we have (both direct and) indirect evidence that differences in uniform velocity are real, as are 
transformations from one uniform velocity to another. 
 
6. Conclusion 
I conclude by drawing some morals from this investigation of perfect symmetries. The first moral 
is that most, if not all, empirical symmetries relate localized rather than global situations. 
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 Sometimes a symmetry masquerades as empirical when it is a merely theoretical 
symmetry of a theory’s global models. Gauge theories provide examples of this phenomenon, as I 
have discussed elsewhere.14 General covariance provides another important example. 
 In discussions of the general covariance of a space-time theory like the general theory of 
relativity, it is important to distinguish covariance of a theory’s equations under smooth 
coordinate transformations from diffeomorphic equivalence among models of the theory. This 
distinction is commonly glossed by calling a coordinate transformation passive while a manifold 
diffeomorphism is active. The terminology suggests that while performing a coordinate 
transformation in a generally covariant theory merely leads to an alternative representation of a 
given situation, performing a diffeomorphism on a model results in a model of a physically 
distinct situation. Taking this suggestion seriously leads to the notorious “hole argument”.15 
 Diffeomorphisms are theoretical symmetries of a generally covariant theory. But a 
symmetry of global models of such a theory (i.e. models that serve to represent all of space-time) 
cannot imply a corresponding empirical symmetry in accordance with the argument illustrated in 
the previous section and detailed in Appendix A. Lacking such an argument, there seems no good 
reason to believe that the theoretical symmetry under diffeomorphisms of a generally covariant 
theory reflects any corresponding empirical symmetry.16 Indeed, careful general relativity texts 
now point out that diffeomorphically related models merely offer alternative representations of 
the same global situation. 
 Contrast this with another instance of a symmetry related to general relativity, this time 
involving localized situations. On the road to general relativity, Einstein focused on a particular 
empirical symmetry of gravitational phenomena that followed from the equality of (passive) 
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gravitational and inertial mass. Measurements of mechanical phenomena cannot distinguish a 
situation involving a uniform gravitational field from a similar situation involving a uniform 
acceleration. Consequently,  
‘The gravitational field has only a relative existence [...] Because for an observer freely falling 
from the roof of a house—at least in his immediate surroundings—there exists no gravitational 
field.’ 
Einstein called this ‘the happiest thought of my life’! His general theory of relativity finally 
enabled him to account for the perfect empirical symmetry among situations in which we take a 
system to be subject to no gravitational field.  An appropriate diffeomorphism applied to a 
localized model of a freely-falling system will produce a model of a distinct situation involving a 
similar freely-falling system elsewhere in a common space-time. 
 The second moral is that even though empirical symmetries concern nature rather than our 
representations of it, theories are very important tools in revealing perfect empirical symmetries. 
 One reason is that theoretical models often introduce the structures that provide our best 
way of representing situations related by a perfect symmetry. Many symmetries of Euclidean 
geometry may be represented without introducing mathematical structures such as real numbers 
to serve as measures of angles and lengths. But it is not so easy to represent empirical Lorentz 
boost symmetry or flavor SU(3) symmetry (say) without appeal to a fair amount of the 
mathematical structure that accompanies theoretical models of those symmetries. 
 A second reason is deeper. Real life situations almost never display perfect empirical 
symmetries. The world is a complicated and messy place, and actual situations are rarely 
duplicated in all their details. In theory construction physicists abstract from and idealize real life 
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situations in order to focus on what they consider their essential features. Debs and Redhead 
([2007]) mark this process by interposing what they call a conceptual model between a situation 
in unvarnished nature and a mathematical model that a theory uses to represent it. While a 
brilliantly original thinker like Galileo may have been able to arrive at a good conceptual model 
without the aid of a theory, I believe it is increasingly common for physicists to view the world 
through the lens of their theories. From this perspective, the mathematical model may precede the 
conceptual model in their thinking, in which case the features of an actual situation will naturally 
come to be represented in terms of the theoretical models applied to it. 
 For these reasons, when a theory reveals an empirical symmetry as perfect, it may not 
simply recharacterize a previously acknowledged empirical symmetry. Rather, the theory gives us 
a new way of conceptualizing the situations it relates, along with a set of mathematical models to 
represent them. If there is an isomorphism between model and (idealized) situation, this is then 
something that is read into the situation by reconceptualizing its structure, rather than discovered 
on the basis of an independent, pre-existing description of that situation. 
 This has implications for the notion of intrinsic properties. Recall that situations related by 
a perfect empirical symmetry are duplicates—each shares all intrinsic properties of the other. 
When a theory exhibits a perfect empirical symmetry corresponding to a theoretical symmetry, it 
thereby displays or at least circumscribes what these intrinsic properties are. It is through the 
development of physical theories that we learn more about the fundamental intrinsic properties of 
the world. 
 In this way we get a better grasp not only on the list of intrinsic properties, but also on 
what it is for a property to be intrinsic. Here is a way in which physical science merges with 
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metaphysics. A property of an object is intrinsic just in case every duplicate object has that 
property: a relation among parts of an object is intrinsic just in case it holds among the 
corresponding parts in every duplicate of that object. Duplicate situations share all intrinsic 
properties. This is true just in case there is a 1-1 correspondence between duplicate objects in the 
two situations that induces an isomorphism between their intrinsic relations. Duplicate situations 
are those that are related by perfect empirical symmetries. The progress of physical theorizing 
gives us richer and more widely applicable models with which we are able successfully to 
represent situations. Physics claims a perfect empirical symmetry when it is implied by a 
theoretical symmetry of such models. 
 According to Lewis ([1986], p. 60) ‘What physics has undertaken, whether or not ours is a 
world where the undertaking will succeed, is an inventory of the sparse properties of this-worldly 
things.’ The sparse properties are supposedly those that ‘carve at the joints’: he later calls such 
properties natural, and even relies on the notion of a natural property in his attempts to analyze 
the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. But we do not need to assume our world 
comes “pre-packaged” in order to appreciate the significant improvements in and enrichments of 
our categorizations made possible by advances in our physical theories. 
 
           
                                                          
1 By extending isospin symmetry from a global to a local gauge symmetry, Yang and Mills 
([1954]) produced the first of the gauge theories that now bear their name. These theories are now 
fundamental to the Standard Model of elementary particles. Flavor SU(3) symmetry was key to 
the origin of the quark model. BRST symmetry, and symmetries associated with the 
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renormalization group, are now basic theoretical tools of high energy and condensed matter 
physics. 
2 Earman ([1989]) gave a classic analysis of the relation between dynamical and space-time 
symmetries of a theory. A number of essays in (Brading and Castellani (eds), [2003]) distinguish 
different kinds of symmetry that may be associated with a theory. 
3 Galileo may have taken his observations rather to provide support for a principle of the relativity 
of uniform circular motion about the earth’s center. Galileo’s ship could not have been moving at 
constant uniform velocity even if its motion across the ocean were perfectly smooth. Horizontal 
motion follows the curvature of the earth; the earth rotates about its axis and orbits the sun; etc. 
But to detect the ship’s slight resulting deviation from inertial motion observations much more 
precise than those described by Galileo would be needed. 
4 In a different theoretical context where electromagnetism is coupled to quantum mechanical 
matter of charge e represented by a wave-function or quantized field R, a local gauge 
transformation also acts on R as follows: R→exp(-ie7)R. A global gauge transformation 
corresponding to 7=constant then induces a constant phase shift in R : but such a global gauge 
transformation induces only the trivial identity transformation on A:. Throughout the paper I 
apply the term ‘local’ only to gauge transformations in this customary way to forestall 
misunderstandings, despite misgivings about the aptness of that terminology (cf. Earman [2002]). 
5  f satisfies the condition that Sf = S just in case f is an automorphism of S: i.e. a bijective map 
from D onto itself such that œa,b0D(aRib iff f(a)Ri f(b) ) (i=1,...,n). (Thanks to Fred Muller—first 
for questioning this equivalence, and then for proving that it holds.) 
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6 Intuitively, a property of an object is intrinsic if and only if the object’s having that property 
does not depend on the existence or (intrinsic!) properties of any object distinct from it. I shall 
have more to say about the notion of an intrinsic property, which has proven notoriously resistant 
to deeper philosophical analysis, in the conclusion to this paper (section 6). 
7 Ismael and van Fraassen think of a theory as specifying sets of possible worlds (the physically 
possible as a subset of the metaphysically possible), rather than models (regarded as mathematical 
structures), which serves to blur this distinction. 
8 See (Earman [1989]; Belot [2001]; Ismael and van Fraassen [2003]; Roberts [2008]). 
9 See the papers by Norton and Stachel in (Howard, D. and Stachel, J. eds. [1989]). 
10 There are also important differences between the cases. Elimination of a structure representing 
absolute space from the models of Newton’s theory did not necessitate any further radical 
revisions—in the structure of time, or in dynamics (though dropping absolute velocity did require 
a corresponding relativization of magnitudes such as kinetic energy): elimination of a structure 
representing absolute space from the models of Maxwell’s theory entailed radical revisions in the 
structure of time, and in Newtonian dynamics. By postulating the special principle of relativity, 
Einstein immediately generalized the empirical symmetries of uniform velocity boosts not just to 
electrodynamic phenomena but to all physical phenomena; even after its revision, Newton’s 
theory only implied that uniform velocity boosts are empirical symmetries of mechanical 
phenomena within the scope of the theory.  
11 In such a joint model, electric fields external to the cubes derive instead from a time-varying 
(curl-free) magnetic vector potential. The existence of such models is a simple consequence of the 
theoretical local gauge symmetry of classical electromagnetism (see Appendix B). 
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12 Thanks to David Wallace for stressing this point. If C+ and C0 coexist throughout an interval of 
time, this will be a curve in their common space: If C0rC+ is a situation in which a single 
uncharged cube is charged, so that C+ is its equilibrium internal situation at a later time than C0, 
then it will be a time-like curve. 
13 One can alter the size of their relative 3-velocity by changing frames, but this merely changes 
how their 4-vector relative velocity is projected onto different hyperplanes of simultaneity. The 
magnitude of the difference in 4-velocities is Lorentz invariant. 
14 In my ([2007]). See in particular the discussion of “large” gauge transformations and the θ-
vacuum of non-Abelian gauge field theories in chapter 6. 
15 For which, see (Earman and Norton ([1987]) and the literature it spawned: and (Howard, D. 
and Stachel, J. eds. [1989]) for details of Einstein’s original “hole argument”. 
16 Some may suppose that space-time substantivalism provides such a reason. I disagree, for 
reasons outlined in my ([1995]). 
Appendix A
Let ;  2M() be structures with domains D; D respectively.
Since  2M(), there is a possible situation a and a bijective representing
function ra such that  represents a via ra (ra : Da ! D, where Da is the
domain of objects in a).
Suppose that ' : M() ! M() is a theoretical symmetry of , with
 = '(). Then  also represents a via r0a = '  ra (r0a : Da ! D). Moreover,
' denes a bijective map ' : D ! D between the domains of ; .
Now make the following
Assumption: h; h dene embeddings of ;  as substructures 0; 0 of a
structure    2 M() with domain D such that D0 = h(D); D0 =
h(D) and D0 ; D0  D with D0 \D0 = ;.
Then 0 represents a in    via the bijective function h  ra : Da !
D0 . Since    2 M(), this representation of a may be extended to a
representation of a situation a b of which a is a sub-situation, via a bijective
function r : Dab ! D such that rDa = h  ra. Then 0 represents a and
0 represents a sub-situation b (via r), where Db is the domain of objects in b,
and Da \Db = ;, since r is bijective.
Now consider the function rb  h 1 

rDb

:  represents b via rb. Moreover
rb 6= r0a, since they have non-overlapping domains. So  not only represents
situation a via r0a,  also represents a distinct situation b via rb. a and b are
distinct because    models a situation a  b incorporating both a and b as
sub-situations with non-overlapping domains.
Now specialize to a case in which we are considering a theory  that models
the behavior of physical systems located in a xed, at space-time. As model of
such a space-time we have a structure < M;Ai >, where M is a 4-dimensional
di¤erentiable manifold representing space-time, and the Ai are xed geometric
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object elds representing the at space-time background.
For a special relativistic theory, the Ai include the Minkowski metric tensor 
determining the light-cone and spatio-temporal metric structure, and the unique
compatible symmetric a¢ ne connection D that makes this a at a¢ ne space,
representing the inertial structure.
For a Newtonian theory, the Ai include objects representing an absolute
temporal as well as spatial metric, a at a¢ ne connection compatible with
these dening the inertial structure, and possibly also a vector eld dening
a timelike congruence of inertial lines representing the trajectories of points of
absolute space.
A global model of extends this model of space-time to a model< M;Ai; Oj >
of dynamical processes in space-time by the addition of geometric object elds
Oj intended to represent such processes. For example, source-free electromag-
netism includes the Maxwell-Faraday tensor Fab, intended to model the behavior
of electromagnetic elds.
But  will also be assumed to possess localized models of the form <
U;AiU ; Oj >, where U is a 4-dimensional submanifold of M , the AiU are re-
strictions of the Ai to U , and the Oj are geometric object elds on U intended
to model the behavior of systems in a restricted region of space-time modeled
by U .
Now consider two models ;  2M() of :  =< U; AiU ; Oj >;  =<
U ; AiU ; O

j > related by a theoretical symmetry ' that denes a di¤eomor-
phism ' : U ! U representing a space-time translation: AiU j '(x) = AiU jx.
 represents a situation a via representing function ra : Ra ! U, where Ra
is the region of space-time occupied by a.  also represents a via r0a = '  ra.
Assumption: There exists a structure    2 M() of the form <
U;AiU ; Oj > such that ;  are each sub-structures of  with U \U = ;:
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where U; U  U , AiU = (AiU )U , AiUb = (AiU )Ub , Oj = OjU ; O

j =
OjU .
N.B. The Assumption may hold when ' itself simply represents a space-
time translation: in that case, Oj = '
Oj , where '
 is the drag along of ': 
'Oj
 j '(x) = Oj jx. We are chiey interested in cases in which the transfor-
mation ' represents something other than a simple space-time translation.
In   ,  represents a via the bijective function ra : Ra ! U. Since
 2M(), this representation of a may be extended to a representation of a
situation ab of which a is a sub-situation, via a bijective function r : Rab ! U
such that rRa = ra. Then  represents a and  represents a sub-situation b,
where Rb is the space-time region occupied by b, and Ra \ Rb = ;, since r is
bijective.
Now  represents b via rRb . Moreover rb 6= r0a, since they have non-
overlapping domains. So  not only represents a via r0a,  also represents a
distinct situation b: a and b are distinct because    models situation a  b
incorporating both a and b as sub-situations occupying disjoint space-time re-
gions.
So when the Assumption holds, the theoretical symmetry ' implies a perfect
empirical symmetry f between situations a and b. For a single model of 
(namely ) may be used to represent either situation.
But what kind of symmetry is f? In particular, is it some new dynamical
symmetry that is uniquely represented by '?
Suppose that    represents a  b via r, and that ' does not simply
represent a space-time translation.
There may be a distinct model  that also represents a  b via r : indeed,
any non-trivial theoretical symmetry of  applied to    will produce such
a model. If some model  2 M() representing a  b represents a and b as
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related just by a space-time translation, then ' does not represent some new
dynamical symmetry: it relates distinct situations that  can represent (by )
as di¤ering simply by a space-time translation.
Suppose on the other hand that every structure  related to    by a
theoretical symmetry of  represents a as di¤ering from b in some way that does
not correspond to a mere space-time translation. Suppose further that there is
some new dynamical relation R' that all such models  represent a as bearing
to b, and that this depends uniquely on ' (as the notation R' indicates). R' is
a new dynamical relation since it is represented in  by a di¤erence between
the Oj and the '
Oj that would have represented the space-time translates of
the Oj if ' had simply represented a space-time translation of a to b. Then the
theoretical symmetry ' of  implies a corresponding new dynamical symmetry
f . f is a perfect empirical symmetry of situations modeled by , and any two
f -related situations are related by R' :
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Appendix B
We wish to exhibit a joint model C0  C+ of the charged and uncharged
cubes within classical electromagnetism that represents the electric potentials
inside both cubes by the same function.
Suppose the charged and uncharged cubes are very big, and are put side
by side, with a small gap between them. In the static situation there will be
no magnetic elds, and we can ignore the exterior of the two cubes except for
the small gap between them, where there will be a uniform electric eld normal
to their adjoining faces. To further simplify, assume the electric eld is zero
everywhere inside the cubes. The problem then has only one spatial dimension
of interest: put the origin of the x-axis on the face of the uncharged cube, with
the adjacent face of the charged cube at x = a.
In one gauge, the electromagnetic potential takes the form
'(x) = 0 (x < 0), inside the uncharged cube
= '0
x
a

(0 < x < a), between the cubes (1)
= '0 (x > a), inside the charged cube
A(x) = 0
Now perform a gauge transformation of the form
'!'+ @=@t (2)
A! A r
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with
 = f(x)t
rr = 0 (trivially)
f(x) = 0 (x < 0) (3)
=  
x
a

'0 (0 < x < a)
=  '0 (x > a)
The transformed potentials are
' = 0 x 6= 0; a
Ay = Az = 0 (4)
Ax = 0 (x < 0) (5)
=
'0
a
t (0 < x < a)
= 0 (x > a)
The elds are given by
E =  r'  @A
@t
(6)
B = rA
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which gives
E = 0 (x < 0)
=  1
a
'0 (0 < x < a) (7)
= 0 (x > a)
B = 0
both for the original and for the transformed potentials, with discontinuities at
x = 0; a where charge has accumulated. In this new gauge, the electric potential
inside both cubes is given by the same function, namely ' = 0.
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